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ABSTRACT 
The Political Business Cycle: Endogenous Election Timing & Hyperbolic Memory 
Discounting 
by 
Jake R. Cottle, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2019 
 
Major Professor: Dr. T. Scott Findley 
Department: Economics and Finance 
 
 In the last 47 years there has been significant research on political determinants of 
macroeconomic cycles. The goal of this paper is to add to this line of research by 
extending the theoretical and empirical work of Nordhaus, D. Chappell, D.A. Peel, and 
Scott Findley. Nordhaus (1975) provided us with the first model depicting a rational 
politician who utilized monetary policy (i.e. inflation rate) to target levels of inflation and 
unemployment to maximize the number of votes needed for reelection. Chappel and Peel 
(1979) endogenized time in order to reflect governments such as England and Japan 
where the incumbent government selects the time of election that maximizes their total 
number of votes. Findley (2015), utilizing research from psychology, takes Nordhaus's 
original model and instead of voter’s memories decaying exponentially he describes a 
voter whose memories decay hyperbolically. The idea of hyperbolic memory discounting 
is well documented in psychology literature and is described as a more accurate function 
of how individuals’ memories decay over time. In this paper, I utilized Nordhaus's 
original model and added to it the endogenized time variable, Chappel and Peel (1979) 
 iv 
and hyperbolic memory discount function, Findley (2015). I then compared the optimal 
date of election, E*, between the two models that differ only in how voters’ weight past 
political-economic conditions. I then looked at the time paths of the inflation and 
unemployment functions to describe their behavior in relation to one another.  
 (38 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
The Political Business Cycle: Endogenous Election Timing & Hyperbolic Memory 
Discounting 
Jake R. Cottle 
 
In the models analyzed in this paper, there exists an incumbent politician with one 
objective, two choices, and voters who remember the past differently. The politician's 
primary goal is to get reelected, which is done by maximizing the number of votes on the 
day of election. The politician can increase their chances of reelection if they influence 
the state of the economy over time and ensure the economy is in its 'best' state on the 
days leading up to the election  
In conducting this research, I wanted to study how different rates of memory 
decay influences the choices the politician makes during the course of their term. Also, I 
wanted to explore how long a politician would wait to have an election if that were a 
choice they could make. I found that voters who remember more of the past place a 
greater constraint on the incumbent leading to moderate fluctuations in the economy and 
frequent elections.   
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Introduction 
 
 This paper explores how the predictions of the vintage political business cycle 
framework are altered when some key assumptions are relaxed in the vintage framework. 
Building on published work by Nordhaus (1975), Chappell and Peel (1979), and Findley 
(2015), I re-examine the standard framework by studying what happens when voters 
weight past political-economic conditions differently. Specifically, I study what happens 
to the predictions of the model for the optimal time paths of the unemployment rate, the 
inflation rate, in addition to the optimal timing of the election date, when voters weight 
the past hyperbolically (consistent with Jost's Second Law of Forgetting), instead of 
exponentially. As I report below, I find that hyperbolic memory discounting has first-
order impacts on the key predictions of the benchmark political business cycle 
framework, especially on the prediction of when to select the timing of elections, in order 
to improve the chances of re-election. 
 
1. "The Political Business Cycle" (Nordhaus 1975) 
 Nordhaus (1975) was a catalyst for what would become a long line of research 
dedicated to modeling the interaction between government and macro-economic 
conditions. Nordhaus was influenced by the earlier work of Kalecki (1943) who 
challenged the 'benevolent dictator' image of the government painted by early 
Keynesians, who believed that the government can and should provide economic stability 
through monetary and fiscal policies, implying that government wanted stability. Instead, 
Kalecki (1943) qualitatively described a world in which government (politicians) created 
 2 
recessions in order to weaken the bargaining power of workers on behalf of captains of 
industry.  
 Nordhaus (1975) was the first to quantitatively model macroeconomic conditions 
with these new political considerations brought to light by Kalecki (1943). The 
framework represents a world in which elected policymakers pull the levers of monetary 
and fiscal policy in order to influence the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, to 
make economic conditions favorable for reelection (maximize votes). Voters are assumed 
to prefer stable prices and low unemployment rates and they care about the past and 
present state of the economy when it comes to how they decide to vote. Periodically, the 
electorate is faced with a choice between two notional parties (economic 
ideologies/preferences), if the condition of the economy is better than some arbitrary 
expectation of 'usual' behavior than they vote for the incumbent, if not it’s a vote against 
the incumbent.  
 The solutions to the benchmark framework prescribe the policies that an 
incumbent politician should take over the course of the electoral regime in order to 
maximize the chances of reelection. Nordhaus's model results in policies that would lead 
to a politically induced business cycle with higher unemployment immediately after 
election, to combat high inflation, followed by a constant decrease in the unemployment 
rate over the entire election period. The model is formally described under Section 2 with 
an extension from Chappell and Peel (1979). 
 Post Nordhaus, there have been several papers examining the relationship 
between government and economic conditions. One of the main threads has been whether 
voters are forward-looking or backward-looking when deciding how to vote. 
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Retrospective voting behavior is surveyed extensively in Murakami (2008) and is 
reported to be more prevalent than previously reported. Retrospective voting is a 
referendum on the incumbent governments past performance relative to some arbitrary 
standard of performance, completely discounting future political promises (Hibbs 2006). 
Whereas, prospective voting is described as investing in the rationally formed 
expectations of future benefit discounting previous behavior (Hibbs 2006). Initially 
retrospective voting was considered to be a requirement to observe a cyclical pattern in 
macroeconomic outcomes; however, research since Nordhaus (1975) has identified that 
asymmetric information between the incumbent government and the voter is sufficient to 
provide the same cyclical effects (Snowden 1997). Given the large empirical evidence in 
both political science and psychology research, I will use the assumption of a 
retrospective voter. 
 
2.  Replication: "The political theory of the business cycle" Chappell and Peel 
(1979) 
 a. Overview 
 Chappell and Peel (1979) extended Nordhaus's original model by allowing for the 
timing of elections to be a choice of the incumbent, rather than being exogenously fixed. 
This implies that an incumbent government is free to call an election when it is in the 
incumbent's best interest, as compared to systems in which the timing of elections is 
prescribed by law, such as every four years in the United States. This model better 
represents the set of political opportunities available to incumbent governments in a 
country like the United Kingdom or Japan. In the United Kingdom, an incumbent 
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government is free to call an election when they want but must do so no later than five 
years from the previous election. The model of Chappell and Peel (1979) models this 
political opportunity in the following way: 
 b. The Model 
  The Vote Function is 
   (1) 
where 
 = unemployment rate 
 = rate of inflation 
 = positive constant 
 = weighting factor 
 = date of the next election 
  The Short-Run Phillips curve: 
   (2) 
  The time evolution of inflation expectations is governed by: 
   (3) 
 = positive constant 
 The government maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3).  
The Hamiltonian is:    
   (4) 
 = continuous function of time (co-state variable) 
Necessary conditions for an interior optimum are: 
WT = [−u
2 − βρ]ert dt
0
T
∫
u
ρ
β ,α0 ,α1
r
T
ρ =α0 −α1u +υ
dυ
dt
= φ(ρ −υ)
φ
H[u(t),υ(t),λ(t),t]= −u2ert − βert (α0 −α1u +υ)+ λφ(α0 −α1u)
λ
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   (5) 
    
   (6) 
  
 
 c. Solving for the Optimal Time Paths for a Given Election Date 
 The first step in solving the system of differential equations, (3) and (6), is to find 
: 
   (7) 
where  is a constant of integration. Apply the transversality condition  to find
: 
 
Insert  into (7) to obtain equation (8): 
   (8) 
∂H[i]
∂u
= −2uert + βα1e
rt − λφα1 =
Set
0
−2uert = λφα1 − βα1e
rt
u = −
λφα1 − βα1e
rt
2ert
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u =
α1
2
β − λφe−rt( )
∂H[i]
∂υ
= −βert =
Set
− dλ
dt
dλ
dt
= βert
λ(t)
λ(t) = dλ
dt
dt = βert dt = β
r
ert + c1∫∫
c1 λ(T ) = 0
c1
λ(T ) = β
r
erT + c1 = 0
c1 = −
β
r
erT
c1
λ(t) = β
r
ert − β
r
erT = β
r
(ert − erT )
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 Insert (8) into (5) in order to find , the optimal path of the unemployment 
rate, which is a function of a given election date, .  
   
   (9) 
To solve for  , the optimal path of the expected inflation rate, recall equation (3) 
and integrate both sides. 
 
   (10) 
where  is a constant of integration.  
 Set to solve for :  
 
 where . Insert  into (10): 
u*(t)
T
u*(t) =
α1
2
β − β
r
(ert − erT )φe−rt
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
α1β
2r
[r − (ert − erT )φe−rt ]
=
α1β
2r
[r −φerte−rt +φerTe−rt ]
u*(t) =
α1β
2r
[r −φ +φer (T−t ) ]
υ *(t)
dυ(t)
dt
= φ[ρ −υ(t)]
dυ(t)
dt
= φ[α0 −α1u(t)+υ(t)−υ(t)]
dυ(t)
dt
= φ[α0 −α1u(t)]
υ(t) = dυ(t)
dt
dt = {φ[α0 −α1u(s)]}ds
t
∫ + c2∫
c2
t = 0 c2
υ(0) = {φ[α0 −α1u(s)]}ds
0
∫ + c2
c2 =υ0 − {φ[α0 −α1u(s)]}ds
0
∫
υ(0) =υ0 c2
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   (11) 
Side calculation for  utilizing (9):  
   
   (12) 
 Substitute (12) into (11) to obtain : 
 
   (13) 
υ(t) = dυ(t)
dt
dt = {φ[α0 −α1u(s)]}ds
t
∫ +υ0 − {φ[α0 −α1u(s)]}ds
0
∫∫
υ(t) =υ0 + {φ[α0 −α1u(s)]}ds
0
t
∫
υ(t) =υ0 + φα0 ds
0
t
∫ − φα1u(s)ds
0
t
∫
υ(t) =υ0 +φα0t −φα1 u(s)ds
0
t
∫
u(s)ds
0
t
∫
u(s)ds
0
t
∫ =
α1β
2r
[r −φ +φer (T−s) ]ds
0
t
∫
=
α1β
2r
[ r ds
0
t
∫ − φ ds
0
t
∫ + φer (T−s) ds
0
t
∫ ]
=
α1β
2r
{rt −φt + [φer (T−s) (− 1
r
)]0
t }
=
α1β
2r
{rt −φt +φerT (− 1
r
e−rt + 1
r
)}
u(s)ds
0
t
∫ =
α1β
2r
{rt −φt − φe
rT
r
(e−rt −1)}
υ *(t)
υ(t) =υ0 +φα0t −φα1[
α1β
2r
{rt −φt − φe
rT
r
(e−rt −1)}]
υ(t) =υ0 +φα0t −
φα1
2β
2r
{rt −φt + φe
rT
r
(1− e−rt )}
υ(t) =υ0 +φα0t −
rφα1
2βt
2r
+
φ 2α1
2βt
2r
−
φ 2α1
2βerT (1− e−rt )
2r 2
υ *(t) =υ0 +φ[α0 −
α1
2β(r −φ)
2r
]t −
φ 2α1
2βerT (1− e−rt )
2r 2
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which determines the actual inflation rate via (2).  
 d. Solving the Optimal Election Date  
 Now that the optimal paths for the unemployment rate, the expected inflation rate, 
and the actual inflation rate have been derived, they can be inserted into the Hamiltonian 
to find the optimal date of re-election from the incumbent's perspective, . 
   (14) 
  
Remembering that the transversality condition is , the optimality condition 
becomes: 
   (15) 
Evaluate (9) and (13) at : 
   (16) 
   (17) 
and then insert (16) and (17) into (15): 
 
Divide both sides by : 
 
T *
M (T ) = sup
{u}
H[u*(T ),υ *(T ),λ(T ),T ]= 0
M (T ) = −u*(T )2erT − βerT [α0 −α1u*(T )+υ *(T )]+ λ(T )φ[α0 −α1u*(T )]= 0
λ(T ) = 0
M (T ) = −u*(T )2erT − βerT [α0 −α1u*(T )+υ *(T )]= 0
t = T
u*(T ) =
α1
2
β − λ(T )φe−rT( ) = α1β2
υ *(T ) =υ0 +φ[α0 −
α1
2β(r −φ)
2r
]T −
φ 2α1
2βerT (1− e−rT )
2r 2
M (T ) = −(
α1β
2
)2erT − βerT [α0 −α1(
α1β
2
)+{υ0 +φ[α0 −
α1
2β(r −φ)
2r
]T −
φ 2α1
2βerT (1− e−rT )
2r 2
}]= 0
βerT{−
α1
2β
4
−α0 +
α1
2β
2
−υ0 −φ[α0 +
α1
2β(φ − r)
2r
]T +
φ 2α1
2β(erT −1)
2r 2
}= 0
βerT
−
α1
2β
4
−α0 +
α1
2β
2
−υ0 −φ[α0 +
α1
2β(φ − r)
2r
]T +
φ 2α1
2β(erT −1)
2r 2
= 0
α1
2β
2
−
α1
2β
4
−α0 −υ0 −φ[α0 +
α1
2β(φ − r)
2r
]T +
φ 2α1
2βerT
2r 2
−
φ 2α1
2β
2r 2
= 0
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Rearrange algebraically further: 
 
Rearrange algebraically a second time: 
 
Define the inherited rate of inflation, , in the following way: 
  (18) 
which implies 
   (19) 
 e. Numerical Examples 
 In order to numerically replicate the findings in Chappell and Peel (1979), values 
for observable parameters are taken directly from their paper. Moreover, equation (18) is 
solved in terms of , given that actual inflation rates are observable, while expectations 
are more difficult to observe empirically. This means that  is a function of the 
parameters of the model, including  and . 
 Chappell and Peel (1979) obtained a value of  years for their first set 
of parameter values. Utilizing similar analytical methods and parameter values, I obtain a 
value of  years. It appears that the discrepancy is the result of the fact that 
computational abilities have progressed significantly between 1979 and the present. To 
further investigate this conjecture, upon consultation, I numerically depict in Figure 1 
α1
2β
2
−
α1
2β
4
−α0 −υ0 −φ[α0 +
α1
2β(φ − r)
2r
]T +
φ 2α1
2βerT
2r 2
+{
φrα1
2βerT
2r 2
−
φrα1
2βerT
2r 2
}−
φ 2α1
2β
2r 2
= 0
α1
2β
2
−
α1
2β
4
−α0 −υ0 −φ[α0 +
α1
2β(φ − r)
2r
]T + [
φα1
2β(φ − r)
2r 2
]erT +
φα1
2βerT
2r
−
φ 2α1
2β
2r 2
= 0
[
φα1
2β(φ − r)
2r 2
]erT −φ[α0 +
α1
2β(φ − r)
2r
]T −α0 −υ0 +
φα1
2βerT
2r
+
α1
2βr
2r
−
φrα1
2β
2r 2
−
α1
2β
4
−
φ 2α1
2β
2r 2
+
φrα1
2β
2r 2
= 0
P0
P0 =α0 +υ0 −
φα1
2βerT
2r
−
α1
2βr
2r
+
φrα1
2β
2r 2
[
φα1
2β(φ − r)
2r 2
]erT −φ[α0 +
α1
2β(φ − r)
2r
]T − [P0 +
α1
2β
4
+
α1
2βφ(φ − r)
2r 2
]= 0
υ0
υ0
P0 T
T*= 14.66
T*= 13.43
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how (15)-(17), or alternatively, how (19) behaves over a reasonable range of  values. 
Figure 1 shows the values of the Hamiltonian from  to . The values of the 
Hamiltonian range from  to . The value of the Hamiltonian at  
is , whereas the  that I get has a Hamiltonian value of . It is 
therefore likely that improvements in computing have made it possible to more precisely 
approximate the point at which the Hamiltonian is exactly equal to 0. As such, I now 
proceed with the main analysis of the thesis. 
 
3. Hyperbolic Memory Discounting and the Timing of Elections 
 a. Overview 
 In another extension of Nordhaus's seminal work, Findley (2015) evaluated an 
alternative form of the memory discount function. Taking a lesson from the field of 
psychology, Findley (2015) built on a body of research findings that given two memories 
of the same strength, the older will decay at a lower rate than the more recent memory. 
This phenomenon is known in psychology as Jost's Second Law of Forgetting. The 
hyperbolic discount function is the way to mathematically represent Jost's Second Law, 
and thus is utilized as a comparison to the exponential function where memories decay at 
a constant rate over time. Findley (2015) presents a very focused research objective, 
which is to examine how the predictions ( and ) of the vintage political business 
cycle model are affected when voters forget the past hyperbolically, holding all else 
constant.  
 The main finding of Findley (2015) is that the amplitudes of the unemployment 
and inflation rates are moderated for the hyperbolic case as compared to the case of 
T
T = 0 T = 15
−0.0043 0.0023 T = 14.66
.00181 T = 13.43 −.0000033
u* π *
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exponential memory discounting. The lesson implied by the findings of Findley (2015) is 
that an incumbent is hindered in their ability to manipulate the economy at the early part 
of the electoral term. This result stems from the fact that hyperbolic voters retain more of 
their older memories relative to exponential voters.  
 The following sub-sections will formally present the two political business cycle 
models with endogenous dates of election timing and differing memory discount 
functions, exponential (sub-section b) and hyperbolic (sub-section c). I will utilize the 
model and notation of Findley (2015) hereafter.  
 b. The Model 
 The model follows Findley (2015) and parallels the solution technique of 
Chappell and Peel (1979). The objective of an incumbent government is to maximize the 
vote function at time , the date of the next election, by choosing values of , the 
unemployment rate, while taking into account how well voters remember the past. The 
assumption of a vote-maximizing politician is just one of potentially many motives that 
politicians might have and provides a tool kit and a set of properties that allow for the 
following analysis.  
   (20) 
where  is the memory discount function in general form. 
The incumbent government is constrained only by an expectations-augmented short-run 
Phillips Curve relationship 
   (21) 
 
where is the proportion by which expected inflation materializes into actual inflation, 
which for our case will be set equal to one, suggesting that the long-run Phillips Curve is 
E u
max V = υ u(t),π (t)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
0
E
∫ M E − t( )dt
M E − t( )
π (t) =α −ζu(t)+ψε(t)
ψ
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vertical at the natural rate of unemployment.  As in Nordhaus (1975), the expected rate of 
inflation, , evolves adaptively 
  
where 
 = unemployment rate 
 = rate of inflation 
 = slope coefficient of the short-run Phillips Curve 
 = rate of exponential memory decay 
 = hyperbolic discount function parameter 
 = positive constants  
 = time between elections 
Following Findley (2015), the optimal solutions  in general form, as 
obtained from Findley (2015), are 
   (22) 
   (23) 
 
 c. Exponential Memory Discounting: Derivation of and  
 Evaluate (22) and (23) at : 
   (24) 
ε(t)
dε(t)
dt
= γ π (t)− ε(t)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
u
π
ζ
ρ
β
θ ,α
E
u*(t),π *(t)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
u*(t) = θζ
2
1+ γ
M (E − t)
M (E − s)ds
t
E
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
π *(t) =α −ζu*(t)+ ε(0)+ αγ − γζu*( j)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦dj
0
t
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
ue *(E) π e *(E)
E
u*(E) = θζ
2
1+ γ
M (E − E)
M (E − s)ds
E
E
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
= θζ
2
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 (25) 
 
 Assuming that the memory discount function takes the exponential form: 
 
   (26) 
 d. Hyperbolic Memory Discounting: Derivation of and  
 From (25), assuming that the memory discount function takes the hyperbolic 
form:  
 
 Replace: : 
 
π *(E) =α − θζ
2
2
+ ε(0)+ αγ − γθζ
2
2
1+ γ
M (E − j)
M (E − s)ds
j
E
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
dj
0
E
∫
π e *(E) = z +
0
E
∫ αγ −
γθζ 2
2
1+ γ
e−ρ (E− j ) j
E
∫e−ρ (E−s)ds
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
dj
= z +
0
E
∫ αγ −
γθζ 2
2
1+ γ e
ρ (E− j )
ρ
e−ρ (E−s)
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
j
E⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
dj
= z +
0
E
∫ αγ −
γθζ 2
2
1+ γ e
ρ (E− j )
ρ
− γ
ρ
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
dj
π e *(E) = z +αγ E −
γθζ 2E
2
+ γ
2θζ 2E
2ρ2
1− eρE( )+ γ
2θζ 2E
2ρ
z =α − θζ
2
2
+ ε(0)
uh *(E) π h *(E)
π h *(E) =α −
θζ 2
2
+ ε(0)+ αγ − γθζ
2
2
1+ γ
1+ β(E − j)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
−1 1+ β(E − s)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
−1
ds
j
E
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
dj
0
E
∫
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β
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⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
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0
E
∫
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 Side calculation for : 
  Substitute :  
  
 
  Partial Fraction Decomposition: 
  
 
  
   
π h *(E) = z +αγ E −
γθζ 2E
2
− γ
2θζ 2
2β
1+ βE − β j( )ln(1+ βE − β j)dj
0
E
∫
∫ 1+ βE − β j( )ln(1+ βE − β j)dj
w = 1+ βE − β j
w = 1+ βE − β j
dw
dj
= −β j
− 1
β j
dw = dj
− 1
β ∫wln(w)dw
v = 1
2
w2
dv = wdw
u = ln(w)
du = 1
w
dw
− 1
β ∫ wln(w)dw = −
1
β
1
2
w2 ln(w)− 1
2
wdw∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
= − 1
β
1
2
w2 ln(w)− 1
2
1
2
w2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
0
E
∫ 1+ βE − β j( )ln(1+ βE − β j)dj == − 1β
1
2
w2 ln(w)− 1
2
1
2
w2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
0
E
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 Insert (28) into (27): 
   
   (29) 
 
  
4. Analysis 
 There are two primary objectives of this section: (1) understand how the optimal 
timing of the election date,  , differs between exponential and hyperbolic memory 
discounting; and, (2) examine how the optimal paths of unemployment rate and inflation 
rate are affected by changes in the unobserved parameter  and the discount function 
parameters.   
 Baseline parameter values were selected from Findley (2015) in order to stay 
consistent with estimates found from empirical studies and to stay close to the original 
model. The slope coefficient on the short-run Phillips curve, , is set to 0.6 which 
Findley (2015) reports is the midpoint of the range of common estimates. As noted by 
(24), the unemployment rate observed at the time of an election is . Findley (2015) 
utilizes this to calibrate , so the unemployment rate immediately following an election 
is 4%. A value of and ensure the target of 4% is achieved. A value of 
 is chosen to generate a 5% natural rate of unemployment in the model.  
= 1
4β
2(1+ βE)2 ln(1+ βE)+1− (1+ βE)2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
π h *(E) = z +αγ E −
γθζ 2E
2
− γ
2θζ 2
2β
1
4β
2(1+ βE)2 ln(1+ βE)+1− (1+ βE)2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
π h *(E) = z +αγ E −
γθζ 2E
2
− γ
2θζ 2
8β 2
1+ (1+ βE)2 2ln(1+ βE)−1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
z =α − θζ
2
2
+ ε(0)
E *
γ
ζ
θζ / 2
θ
θ = 0.133 ζ = 0.6
α = 0.03
 16 
 In order to be able to compare the models in a meaningful way, I apply the 
technique outlined in Findley (2015) that controls for differences in total memories by 
equalizing the areas under alternative discount functions. This is necessary because 
differences attributed to the different slopes of the alternative discount functions could 
just be the result of differences in total memories (level effects) possessed by a voter who 
forgets exponentially versus a voter who forgets hyperbolically. The exercise of equating 
the areas under the curve is synonymous with equating the total number of memories 
remembered between the dates of elections. This exercise controls for level effects when 
the optimal date of election is the same for both discount functions, but the exercise of 
holding memories constant can be an imperfect control when the dates of election timing 
are allowed to vary with differences in the discount functions.  
 The following steps outline the exercise of equalizing the areas under the 
alternative discount functions. First,  is numerically approximated by performing a 
grid search to approximately determine where the value of the Hamiltonian is equal to 
zero, for a given value of the exponential memory discount rate,  .  Then the discount 
rate of the hyperbolic function, , is chosen in a way that minimizes the sum of the 
squared difference in the areas under the discount functions between  to  . 
Next, with  calibrated, is numerically approximated by performing a numerical 
grid search. This exercise of holding total memories constant does not hold exactly 
because does not equal . The difference in most of the sensitivity analysis is 
relatively small and still provides some interesting observations, recognizing that some of 
the differences in the predictions are due to level effects, and not just due to the slope 
Eexp *
ρ
β
t = 0 t = Eexp *
β Ehyp *
Eexp * Ehyp *
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effects. Figure 12 illustrates a circumstance with larger level effects after controlling for 
slope effects.  
 Table 1 reports differences in values of  for both exponential and hyperbolic 
memory discount functions given various combinations of values for and  when 
 (inherited rate of inflation of 5% from Chappel and Peel (1979)). One 
straightforward observation is that the values of  and  are very close for low 
values of . As increases, given any value of , the difference in  and the 
difference in the area under the discount functions approach zero. This would imply that 
an incumbent politician is less able to manipulate economic conditions when voters 
respond more quickly to changes in prices. Likewise, if voters retain more of their 
memories, then politicians are less able to manipulate economic conditions.  Another 
observation is that the closer the value of the speed of adjustment in inflation 
expectations, , and the rate of exponential memory decay, , the more likely the 
model will generate a value greater than 100% for the unemployment rate at the start of 
the electoral regime. An unemployment rate greater than 100% invalidates the solution 
technique of the optimal control problem.    
 Table 2 is similar to Table 1; however, I have set the inherited rate of inflation 
equal to 2%. It is identified in Chappell and Peel (1979) that a one percentage point 
increase in the inherited rate of inflation will lead to an increase in the optimal date of the 
next election. Table 2 reports a decrease in with the 3% reduction in the inherited rate 
of inflation, which supports the comparative statics analysis in Chappell and Peel (1979). 
All previous analysis of Table 1 holds in Table 2. An additional observation is that on 
E *
γ ρ
π (0) = 0.05
Eexp
* Ehyp
*
ρ γ ρ E *
γ ρ
E *
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average the difference in the areas under the alternative discount functions is greater 
across all combinations of parameter values.  
 As observed in Figures 2-6, holding all else equal, an increase in voters' 
adjustments to prices moderates the amplitude of the unemployment rate, with the 
exponential function more sensitive to changes in values than the hyperbolic function. 
Also observed in Figures 2-6, an increase in the rate of memory decay increases the 
amplitude of the unemployment rate, again affecting the unemployment rate 
corresponding to the exponential function disproportionately. Rates of exponential 
memory decays entertained did not exceed 50% because higher values generated 
unemployment rates that exceeded 100% for the exponential case and could only be 
moderated with a nearly immediate voter response in price changes. Findley (2015) 
discusses empirical estimates in memory discount rates that range from 50%-144%. It 
should be noted that the hyperbolic function continues to generate valid solutions even 
when the exponential function did not. The highest value of the exponential discount rate 
at which I was able to obtain valid solutions and remains within realistic unemployment 
rates was , but it was accompanied by a fast voter response in prices ( ). 
The common finding across all values of the memory discount rate and the speed at 
which voters adjust to inflation expectations is that the optimal policy for an incumbent 
politician is to target a high unemployment rate post-election and continuously decrease 
the unemployment rate up to the date of the next election. 
 Figures 7-11 depict the optimal path of inflation rates. It is observed that the 
amplitude is moderated for the hyperbolic function, as also seen with the unemployment 
rate. The moderated amplitude is much more apparent with higher values of memory 
ρ = 0.7 γ = 0.95
 19 
discount rates. This observation is to be expected given our analysis of results reported in 
Table 1 and 2, where the exponential and hyperbolic functions have different optimal 
dates of the next election. The paths observed in all combinations of the memory discount 
rate and the speed at which voters adjust to inflation expectations is that prices will 
decline quickly and around the midpoint of the electoral regime will then begin to rise 
until the date of the next election. 
 The model is hindered in its ability to entertain higher discount rates reported in 
the psychology research because of the condition observed by Chappell and Peel (1979) 
that requires the speed at which voters adjust to prices be greater than the rate at which 
their memories are discounted ( ). Chappell and Peel (1979) identify this 
condition as being necessary, but in a numerical exercise a unique solution was still 
sometimes found in instances when this condition did not hold. Therefore, it is likely that 
this condition is sufficient rather than necessary.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 Section 1 discussed the impact of the classic-framework model of Nordhaus 
(1977) that was a catalyst for future research on the links between incumbent 
governments and macro-economic conditions. Nordhaus (1977) observed a cyclical 
pattern in both the unemployment and inflation rates. Moreover, the assumption of a 
retrospective voter has been backed up extensively by published work in the fields of 
political science and psychology and the assumption of an opportunistic incumbent 
politician has been observed in a model illustrating an incumbent who faces a lower 
probability of reelection. Section 2 replicates the methodologies used in Chappell and 
γ > ρ,β > 0
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Peel (1979) to find the optimal date of election. Section 3 provides an overview of 
Findley (2015) and the steps to solving the optimal paths of unemployment and inflation 
rates are presented. Section 4 provides an analytical comparison of the effects on the 
optimal timing of elections and the optimal times paths of unemployment and inflation 
rates given alternative forms of memory discounting.  
 I observe cyclical patterns in the unemployment and inflation rates. The 
unemployment rate starts high but then falls continuously up to the date of the next 
election. Prices have a period of deflation at the start of the electoral regime, followed by 
inflationary pressure leading up to the date of the next election. Also, observed is a 
moderated amplitude in the hyperbolic case similar to what is observed in Findley (2015). 
Given changes in the speed of price adaptation and memory discount rates, the model 
with hyperbolic memory discounting provides much more stability in unemployment and 
inflation rates given a wide range of parameter values as observed in the size of the 
amplitudes in the predicted business cycle.  
 The model could be applied to further analysis that might account for higher 
discount rates and a constrained date of the next election. The model is currently unable 
to be studied at parameterizations with high discount rates because of the 'necessary 
condition' observed by Chappell and Peel (1979). A different functional form of the vote 
function may be needed in order to work around this condition in further analysis. 
Incumbent politicians are unconstrained in the date of election in the model. But in the 
case of the United Kingdom, an incumbent government is required to call an election no 
later than five years from the last. It would be a modelling innovation to add this  
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additional facet of reality. It is my goal to incorporate this modelling innovation in future 
research.  
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